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Metaeconomics is a different kind of economics (although, see Speculation), one transcending and going beyond traditional microeconomics, and economics more generally, by considering ethics and economics simultaneously, jointly --- explicitly considering the moral dimension represented in such ideas as commitment, norms, values and individual conscience. In effect, Adam Smith's Impartial Spectator is brought back into the economic frameword--- by recognizing a joint, empathy-sympathy based shared Other-interest evolving in regular interplay and mutual feedback with the egoistic-hedonistic based Self-interest (in "utility," profit, etc.). We want to do the right thing while also wanting to minimize pain while seeking a satisfactory level of pleasure (benefits minus costs being of concern, but conditioned by doing the right thing!). So, it addresses both the material (egoistic-hedonistic) and the moral (empathetic-sympathetic) dimension, simultaneously, seeing them as joint, nonseparable. Metaeconomics also recognizes the need to model The Will and Self-Control/Self-Discipline reflected in symbiotically and synergistically integrating and balancing the two interests. Due to addressing commitment, and introducing this balancing, metaeconomics proposes to fill the empty space, bridging the gap, between microeconomics and macroeconomics by helping improve understanding of the micro-micro (individual within the household and with the firm/organization) to macro (family, firm, group, society) transition, as well as the macro-to-micro transition.
Metaeconomics by its nature is also directed at understanding and explaining what is perceived by the individual as the on-going norms or set of shared values. Said norms are believed (with the need for empirical testing) to influence individual actions and affect the relationship(s) among individuals within a firm or household, as well as among households and firms. Individuals build norm-based networks, with such networks representing how the economy is embedded in society (and how society is embedded in the natural ecosystem). Yet, metaeconomic theory and thinking is focused on the intraperson in contrast to the interpersonal relationships between self and other (i.e., the "we" or "other" is internal to the person), the latter reflecting norms and relationships, and instituions more generally. Metaeconomics also rests on the foundations laid by Maslow's work in psychology: It sees self-actualization as a key part of what leads to the wealth of nations, interpreted as reaching an alternative, distinct plane in human development. Yet, it conditions the Maslowian idea of a hierarchical evolution to actualization with the conjecture that the move to actualization, instead, arises through resolving the continual tension and conflict between the egoistic (self-interested) and empathic (shared other-, or we-interested) tendencies, i.e. "the Me needs a We to Be", yet, recognizing, that "without a Me there is no We." We seek a parsimonious theory and a formal analytical system or framework that models this interdependency, including the interplay and evolution of both egoistic and empathic tendencies and the necessary balancing of same by the will, in a disciplined self-control. Once symbiotically balanced, the individual achieves a kind of "I-Thou" state after emerging as a distinct entity, a position of existence wherein one is identifying with others. This evolution to an integrated and balanced state is also consistent with the Angyal(1941/1965) idea that individuals seek balance and integration in autonomy (mastery, independence) and homonomy (unity, relatedness), within an environment of continual outside pressure and control asserted on the individual, or heteronomy.
Metaeconomics sees the individual being influenced by relationships and by the claims of various communities of interest (trade associations, relationship sales among buyers and sellers, community groups, farm/ranch and environmental organizations as well family and friends). Such claims lead to commitments. Individuals may express the will and discipline to not build these relationships, too. The degree of commitment to a particular group (and the norms represented therein) is an empirical question. The claims have influence through the vehicle of norms and networks (the social capital) that continually evolve and change. The focus is on the individual, consistent with the notion of Individualism. In research and analysis we stay close to methodological individualism, although recognizing the need for a plurality of methodologies. Perhaps a plurality of methodologies also better matches this pluralistic theory of human nature.
Like microeconomics, metaeconomics starts with a sovereign consumer who has interests, and preferences. In the most technical sense, we might envision an individual with two fields of incommensurable utility in the background, and represented in the egoistic and empathetic parts of the triune brain. The other part of the triune brain is the will, the self-control part or mechanism that oversees (in mentally healthy people) the tension in the egoistic and empathic parts, after conscious, rational consideration. By recognizing the possibility for two fields of potentially incommensurable utility (pleasure and morality), it posits the real possibility of two incommensurable interests, each of which arises jointly. Formally, this is represented in two sets of overlapping indifference curves suggesting the potential for a special kind of interdependence (intraperson), and jointness in the two kinds of utility. Working with two sets of indifference curves also facilitates sophisticated mathematical analysis on par with that in standard microeconomics (for these mathematics, see Lynne, 2006a,b).
The overlapping curves idea was Inspired by earlier writings from Etzioni and Frisch, and Berne who is associated with transactional analysis in psychotherapy and the humanistic/existential branch of psychology (e.g., Maslow). Fishbein and Ajzen have also had an influence, especially by the Ajzen theory of planned behavior wherein the individual is modeled as having attitudes (self-interest), norms (shared other-interest) and control (self-control, the will). We have also drawn on recent writings by Khalil (1990), with the concept of a distinct entity arising as a result of standing in a new station, in the spirit of Adam Smith's station of the impartial spectator. The early paper by Frankfurt on the will being that which distinguishes humans from other animals has also had an influence. Sen's ideas about the need to model opportunities and not just constraints, and the need to go beyond the self-interest by recognizing the claims of others, have also been influential. Robert Frank's writing on commitment ties nicely with the shared other-interest being expressed through a disciplined self-control, affecting expression of self-interest. Angyal's holistic theory of personality fits nicely with most if not all of this other work, and, in many ways, sets the foundation on which the rest of it can be integrated. The integration of such widely disparate ideas may well be justified by contemporary research in neuroscience (see Cory, 1999; 2000; MacLean, 1990; Levine, 2006; Wilson, 2006)), and a quick overview in Methodology and Worldview: New Directions in Resource and Environmental Economics (Note: This is a set of slides, a Microsoft PowerPoint presentation, with notes). We also offer metaeconomics in the spirit of E.O. Wilson's hope for one theory of human behavior, as in Consilience, rather than literally dozens of such theories, which is the current state of social and other science.
Metaeconomics sees the norms and shared values, the shared other-interest, as embedded in the Invisible Hand. The hand jointly guides the individual and the market(s) within which said individual participates. Metaeconomics also shifts attention to the positive freedoms (opportunities) in balance with the negative freedoms (constraints), drawing on Sen. It sees the challenge for this distinct chooser as one of being in self-command (expressing will, being disciplined) and emerging as a distinct entity who reflects the individual pursuing a Joint Self-interest and Other(shared)-interest, within self. In effect, metaeconomics expands rational choice by building the will and control over self to symbiotically integrate and balance the egoistic and the empathic, leading to an economics that posits (relative) prices having moral content, and the moral dimension driven in part by relative prices. So, metaeconomics proposes to make the invisible ... visible. It also sees, however, how the ego influences the empathy, and thus how (relative) prices drive the moral dimension, a kind of symbiotic and potentially synergistic feedback being at work.
Prices and costs become subjective rather than objective measures of value due to each such price or cost being affected by the empathic (essentially the emotional, values-based) tendency, and the individual paying attention to/ being influenced by norms, while still having the freedom of/ command over the choice(s). Yet, relative prices are also shown to drive the symbiotic balance between the self-interest and shared other-interest: The material/pleasure and the moral/symbolic dimension are inextricably intertwined. We move away from the moralist perspective that values are always exogenously given, to the perspective that sometimes the moral dimension is driven by relative prices. We propose to subject the moral dimension to benefit-cost calculation not unlike that in the material dimension, albeit still recognizing that sometimes a metaphysical moral dimension needs to trump the self-interest (also, however, the self-interest needs to sometimes trump the moral dimension/ other(shared)-interest). These forces are in constant tension consistent with neuroscience findings on how the human brain is configured and programmed (see Cory, 1999).
Yet, with all said claims, we also recognize that much of what is metaeconomics represents a mere integration of well-known ideas and constructs in economics and other social sciences. We do not claim much that is uniquely new. As Lester (1995, p. 161) points out regarding the similar need for a new theorist to assimilate and integrate the many personality theories in psychology, into one new theory "...such a task requires the services of someone in marketing because the ideas will not be new ones but merely old ones presented in new packaging." In many ways, metaeconomics is only new packaging containing mainly well-known ideas, albeit we believe the integration of the items, and thus the package itself is unique. See Speculation.